Politics, Bureaucracy and the Bogus Administration of Indian Commissioner Lewis Vital Bogy, 1866-1867 by Unrau, William E.
American Indian Law Review
Volume 5 | Number 1
1-1-1977
Politics, Bureaucracy and the Bogus Administration
of Indian Commissioner Lewis Vital Bogy,
1866-1867
William E. Unrau
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
William E. Unrau, Politics, Bureaucracy and the Bogus Administration of Indian Commissioner Lewis Vital Bogy, 1866-1867, 5 Am. Indian
L. Rev. 185 (1977),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol5/iss1/5
POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY AND THE BOGUS
ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN COMMISSIONER
LEWIS VITAL BOGY, 1866-1867
William E. Unrau *
On June 15, 1867, less than three months after he was appointed
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Nathaniel Green Taylor dis-
patched a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional status of
his office to President Andrew Johnson.' This correspondence
came not at the request of the White House, nor was it a response
to queries from Capitol Hill. Even less did it carry the blessing of
Interior Secretary Orville Hickman Browning. It came because a
breach of profound proportions had developed between the In-
dian Office and the Interior Department. While not as significant
as the seemingly endless struggle between the War and Interior
Departments over the proper control and execution of Indian
policy/ its ramifications did little to enhance the reputation of the
federal bureaucracy, let alone the improvement of Indian-white
relations in the distant trans-Missouri West.
To the perplexing Indian problem of the mid-1860's Taylor was
at best a novice. He had the good fortune of being a native of Ten-
nessee, the home of President Johnson, and was available at a time
when the politically beleagured chief executive was literally grasp-
ing at straws to secure second-line federal appointments that
would not further alienate the congressional radicals. Taylor's
principal qualifications were that as a lawyer, ordained Methodist
minister, member of an affluent Tennessee family, and state politi-
cian who had extolled the Unionist cause as early as 1860, he had
earned a reputation as a man of honor and integrity. He had
delivered a number of significant speeches against secession, and
following the disastrous occupation of east Tennessee by the ar-
mies of Generals Longstreet, Burnside, and Sherman, had
journeyed north where in such cities as Philadelphia, New York,
and Boston he had raised nearly a quarter of a million dollars to
aid his suffering neighbors and friends in Tennessee. For his efforts
he was elected to Congress on a moderate Republican platform,
and it was near the end of his first term that President Johnson
selected him to head the Indian Office.3 Visibly distressed that
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Taylor's predecessor, Lewis Vital Bogy of Missouri, had lost the
confidence of Congress, and that Johnson had bypassed his
recommendation that General Henry Hastings Sibley of Min-
nesota be the next Commissioner, Secretary Browning ridiculed
Taylor's qualifications for the office. In his diary he wrote, "I now
have a Methodist preacher at the head of the [Indian] Bureau and
-will do the best I can with him."' Less than three months later
Taylor penned his complaint to President Johnson.
Taylor made no effort to disguise the breach between him and
Browning. It was counterproductive to administrative efficiency,
and to fully understand the source of his frustration it is essential
o consider the stormy-indeed bogus- administration of his
predecessor. Like Taylor, Lewis Vital Bogy enjoyed good family
connections and social status, but in the more remote setting of
frontier Sainte Genevive and then St. Louis, Missouri. He took a
law degree in Transylvania University, fought in the Black Hawk
War, and despite significant losses in various railroad, banking,
and iron mining enterprises, amassed a real estate fortune in
Missouri that by 1851 was assessed at $191,000. His family had
been prominent in Missouri politics and economic affairs dating
back to the Spanish occupation of Louisiana, and his marriage to
the daughter of an influential St. Louis merchant provided him
with even better opportunities for getting ahead.5 In short, Bogy
was far better advised than Taylor regarding the intricate and
often profitable relationships between private enterprise and
government operations in the Indian country.
Bogy was a flexible southern Democrat with a firm commitment
to the development of the trans-Missouri West. On two occasions
ie was defeated in his quest for a national congressional seat, and
he had to satisfy himself with membership on the St. Louis Board
of Aldermen and occasional membership in the Missouri
legislature. At the close of the Civil War he took a firm position
against the radicals in his own state, and following several impor-
tant speeches defending Johnson's veto of the Freedman's Bill, his
popularity with the executive branch increased substantially. He
advocated a national nonpartisan committee to oppose the
radicals, and on one occasion characterized Johnson as "an instru-
ment of high heaven who saved the country from destruction.'6
In the final analysis, however, it was Johnson's disaffection with
Interior Secretary James Harlan of Iowa-and the naming of
Browning to take his place-that gave Bogy his chance. While
Harlan had used his influence to support a group of Iowa and
Connecticut speculators in their efforts to secure control of the
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Delaware Reserve and Cherokee Neutral Lands in Kansas,' this ac-
tion was less distressing to the President than Harlan's failure to
support him against the radical Republicans. Certainly in view of
Browning's contempt for Taylor, and Taylor's subsequent memo
to the President, it seems clear that with Browning's help Johnson
attempted to sacrifice integrity in Indian affairs to his fight for
political survival in 1867.
Certain aspects of Browning's public and private career add
credence to this conclusion. As a prominent Ohio attorney,
Browning had been a close confidant of Lincoln, and like Bogy, a
strong opponent of radical Reconstruction.8 But he had other in-
terests as well, not the least of which was the destruction of the In-
dian land base west of Iowa and Missouri and the rapid white set-
tlement of that region. In this he could depend on the support of
the wealthy and politically adroit Ewing family of Ohio. Thomas
Ewing, Sr. had served as the nation's first Secretary of the Interior
under President Millard Fillmore. During the early Civil War
years, he, his son Thomas, Jr., a government certified attorney for
the Cherokees and first Chief Justice of the Kansas Supreme
Court, and Browning organized a law firm in Washington to pro-
secute Indian land and depredation claims. On numerous occa-
sions he arranged audiences for the younger Ewing with President
Johnson. So notorious were the financial connections between the
Interior Department, the White House, and the activities of
railroad and land speculators on the frontier that one Ohio
reporter on a visit to eastern Kansas advised that "a good fee, and
Thomas Ewing Jr., on one's sid is all that is necessary to secure
almost anything in the line of Indian contracts or government
lands from the Department of the Interior."9 In turn, Bogy was
closely associated with the Indian contracting community, in-
cluding a firm in which his close relatives in St. Louis had direct
interests."° Thus when Browning cast about for an Indian Commis-
sioner well in tune with the forces of economic aggression in the
Indian country and fully prepared to operate the Indian Office
with business-like flexibility, few could match the credentials of
Bogy.
Bogy's appointment was announced on October 8, 1866, to take
effect the following November 1.1 Even under the most stable
political circumstances it would have been a trying time in the In-
dian Office. While the President and Congress feuded over
Reconstruction policy, public confusion and then outrage were
displayed when, in late December, it was announced that all 82
members of Captain J. W. Fetterman's relief party to some be-
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sieged woodcutters near Fort Philip Kearny, deep in the Sioux
country, were ambushed and slaughtered to the man by the In-
dians. A few weeks later Senator James Doolittle's special commit-
tee empowered to investigate the "Condition of the Indian Tribes"
recommended that, contrary to public opinion on the frontier, the
administration of Indian affairs should remain under civilian
control. 2 Backed by the Ewings and other speculators who viewed
a military solution to the Indian problem as detrimental to their
economic objectives, Bogy only further incensed an increasingly
hostile Congress by insisting that the War Department in Indian
country must remain subservient to the Interior Department."
While the Doolittle report was widely branded as a deliberate ef-
Fort to conceal fraud in the Indian Bureau, a western paper
characterized Commissioner-elect Bogy as "one of the most skulk-
ing and cowardly rebels of all wretches of the class who ever
cursed Missouri with the evil of their wicked lives.""
In the meantime, the Senate refused to confirm Bogy's appoint-
ment, primarily as the result of a resolution passed by the House
on December 19, 1866, requiring that certain bids negotiated by
Bogy for the Indian service be canceled until his actions could be
investigated by the House Committee on Indian Affairs." Ac-
cording to the resolution, Bogy had arbitrarily voided several
large contracts awarded by his predecessor, Dennis N. Cooley,
and had then awarded them to firms whose bids were in fact
higher. In testimony before the House Committee, Bogy attemp-
ted to justify his action on the grounds that the Cooley awards
were for inferior merchandise, and that much of it was of foreign
manufacture. In an obvious pitch toward patriotic sentiment and
economic problems occasioned by the recent war, he said,
When those bids were opened in my office, I announced to
the bidders, before I knew one man of them, that it was my
intention to take American goods, made of American raw
material, regardless of the price, provided that the price was
not too far out of the way. I did so, and there is where I stand
today. I have taken only good goods, because it is a duty
which the Government owes to the Indians to protect their
interests. The money disbursed by the Indian Bureau does
not belong to the Government, but to the Indians .... It is
also the duty of the Government to patronize American
manufactures, particularly at this time when our manufac-
tures are languishing, and when, owing to the excessive issue
of paper money, growing out of the recent war, the prices of
labor and of raw material are so high as to prevent our
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manufacturers from competing in the markets of the world
with foreign markets .... I accepted the bid for the only
blankets presented, made of American wool, and I accepted
the bid for the only cloth presented that is to be made of
American wool."6
Firing a verbal broadside at what he termed wealthy eastern
capitalists who because of their political power were running
roughshod over less fortunate western merchants, he concluded
his testimony with a plea for return to the noble principles of
civilization and Christianity among the suffering Indians, and a
warning that, "I intend to reform the Bureau, if it can be done, or I
shall be driven out of it by these mean, dirty speculators who are
swarming about it." '17
These words proved most effective, even though the highly
technical testimony of a variety of witnesses failed to demonstrate
conclusively that the merchandise selected by Bogy was superior
in quality. In what might best be described as an abstrusive con-
clusion, the majority of the Committee that finally exonerated
Bogy of any indictable malfeasance reported, "No improper
motive is attributed to him in this [contractual] regard, but it is
clear that the policy of allowing each one to furnish his own sam-
ple has led to confusion and dissatisfaction and may be used for
fraudulent purposes."'" A minority of the Committee composed of
Congressmen Rosewell Hart, Sidney Clarke, R. T. Van Horn, and
J. H. D. Henderson demanded Bogy's censure on grounds that
"through his relatives, at exorbitant prices and without any writ-
ten requisition for the same as required by law" Bogy had engaged
in the illicit purchase of goods for the Indian Service."'
The censure failed in the House, but the strong minority report
was enough to block Bogy's confirmation in the Senate. Browning
was furious and responded with action calculated to demonstrate
his belief that the Indian Office was being used as an instrument of
partisan politics. On March 4, 1867, he appointed Bogy "Special
Agent" with unlimited authority to execute the very contracts
called into question by the House. Furthermore, Bogy was
authorized to purchase additional merchandise for the Indian Ser-
vice and to contract any and all freight, warehousing, or other ex-
penses deemed essential to carry out the many treaty obligations
of the national government. As authority for this unprecedented
action, Browning cited Section One of the Indian Appropriation
Act of March 3, 1863, which in part provided that "all special
agents and commissioners not appointed by the President shall be
appointed by the Secretary of the Interior.""
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Such grasping at straws was unacceptable to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, which, following the speedy confirmation
of Taylor as Commissioner on March 29, ruled that Browning had
exceeded his constitutional authority.2' By this time Browning was
heavily involved with the Ewings, James Joy, and other competing
railroad promoters seeking to secure control of the vast Osage
reservation in southern Kansas, and he fought back as best he
could.2 In what surely must stand as one of the most self-defeating
actions ever taken by an Interior Secretary, Browning maintained
Bogy on the federal payroll, at a salary exceeding that of Commis-
sioner Taylor. Taylor was bypassed in major policy decisions, and
to add insult to injury, Bogy was allowed to store substantial
quantities of Indian merchandise at government expense, in
warehouses operated by members of his family in St. Louis." It
was at this point that Nathaniel Green Taylor penned his memo to
President Johnson. With undisguised candor, he wrote:
The duties I owe to the public service, to my own official
responsibility, and to your administration in the faithful
management of this Bureau in its conduct towards the civiliz-
ed and savage wards of the nation committed to its care, im-
pel me to address you upon the grave differences existing
between the Secretary of the Interior and myself, as to our
respective rights, duties and responsibilities in the manage-
ment of the Indian Affairs under the organic acts and the
regulations which have been prescribed from time to time by
the President by virtue of the authority invested in him by
Congress.24
There then followed a detailed statutory history of the Commis-
sioner's constitutional responsibilities and authority. Citing the
Act of July 9, 1832,' that established the Indian Bureau, and the
Act of June 30, 1834,8 that amended the commercial code for the
Indian trade, Taylor emphasized that the clear intention of Con-
gress had been to grant to the Indian Commissioner, under the
direction of the Secretary of War but agreeable only to regulations
prescribed by the President, "management of all Indian affairs."
On November 11, 1836, responding to a request from President
Andrew Jackson, the Secretary of War had prepared "Revised
Regulation No. 1," which subsequently was approved by the
President. Its paramount features, which Taylor underlined, were
that,
All business connected with, or arising out of Indian rela-
tions will be transacted in the Office of Indian Affairs under
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the management and direction of the Commissioner ap-
pointed under The Act of July 9, 1832, and that officer will be
held responsible for its prompt, faithful, and legal execution,
subject, however, in all things to the supervision of the Presi-
dent and Secretary of War.
"Revised Regulation No. 3," dated June 1, 1837, stated that all
communications on Indian affairs "must be directed" to the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs. When Indian administration was
transferred to the newly created Interior Department on March 3,
1849, it was clearly stated that the Secretary's responsibility was
to exercise "supervisory and appellate powers." Since that time no
further statutes or regulations had been prescribed.2'
Taylor bemoaned the many encroachments of power that had
taken place in the meantime-encroachments that were a conse-
quence not of statutory authority but the failure of his
predecessors to ward off the political and economic pressures ex-
erted by the various "special interests." Even though the Pension,
Patent, and Land Offices in the Interior Department enjoyed
"powers not so full and complete" as the Indian Office, they were
seldom over-ruled in the normal conduct of their affairs. With a
specific criticism directed at "Special Agent" Bogy, Taylor remind-
ed the President that Secretary Browning had been able to secure
"scarcely an appointment either of Agents or employees," and that
Bogy had failed to provide the kind of leadership so essential dur-
ing a particularly difficult time in Indian-white relations. "All I ask
and desire," said Taylor, "is that the ancient landmarks establish-
ed by law and regulation be restored and that this Bureau shall not
be entirely absorbed in the Interior Department and the Commis-
sioner be required merely to register its edicts."''
Taylor's letter to the President proved persuasive and Bogy was
summarily dismissed from the Indian service. The would-be com-
missioner returned to St. Louis where he remained active in
politics. He aligned himself with the liberal Republican movement
in 1870, but two years later returned to the Democratic fold to
take the Senate seat vacated by Francis Blair. In Washington once
again, he mainly concerned himself with western economic ques-
tions, especially the virtue of an inflationist monetary policy.'
Certainly his influence in Indian affairs following the confronta-
tion with Taylor was minimal. The Methodist minister from Ten-
nessee had at least accomplished that.
This is not to say that Taylor accomplished a major
breakthrough in the improvement of Indian administration. In-
deed, there is some evidence that he too was vulnerable to the pro-
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mise of profit in Indian country. One western editor reported that
toward the close of his administration Taylor was offered more
than 7,000 acres of land for cooperation in securing passage of the
Osage Treaty of 1868. The offer came from the Joy railroad lobby,
but since the Treaty failed of passage and the land was
unavailable, there is no clear evidence of Taylor's intent in the
matter. In any case, he made no public outcry about having been
solicited by Joy.'
On a more positive side, Taylor brought pressure on the Con-
gress to create an independent Indian Department at the Cabinet
level. He was neither the first nor the last to fail in this regard?'
The basic problem was that whenever the issues of more responsi-
ble administration came up it inevitably became clouded by the
larger issues of states' rights and transfer of the Indian Office back
to the War Department. In 1849, for example, during the debate
culminating in the formal creation of the Interior Department,
Senator John C. Calhoun spoke well for his southern constituents
when he predicted that the creation of another Cabinet depart-
ment was evidence that Washington was determined "to absorb all
the remaining powers of the states."" The Browning-Bogy incident
did little to quiet such fears, particularly in the volatile setting of
Reconstruction politics. With good reason Taylor complained that
when he came to the Indian Office it was a mere clerkship with a
poor image, vague authority, and awesome public
responsibilities.' During the famous transfer hearings in the House
nearly a decade later, Lewis Henry Morgan agreed wholehearted-
ly. Without moralizing, the distinguished ethnologist stated:
It is not so much an objection to the present system as the
absence for the past fifty years of anything that could be
called a system .... It would not have been a mistake fifty
years ago if a department of Indian affairs had been created;
it would not be a mistake to create such a department now
and place it in the hands of one of the first men of the
nation."
While Browning's and Bogy's actions certainly were obstacles in
the way of this much-needed reform, it should be remembered
that their machinations prompted Taylor's response, which for a
short time led to a more positive public perception of the Indian
Office. Taylor was soon designated chairman of the powerful In-
dian Peace Commission that laid much of the foundation for
President U.S. Grant's celebrated "Peace Plan.""5 Under Taylor's
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leadership the Commission pursued a vigorous plan of herding the
western tribes onto concentrated reservations, thus making way
for the white man with the plow.6 This, too, had been the objec-
tive of Bogy, and for this he should be given much of the respon-
sibility. More responsibility must be given to him and Browning
for their counterproductive nostrum for improving operations in
the Indian Office. Never was there a time when the Indians needed
better direction from their Great White Father in Washington.
NOTES
1. Taylor to the President of the United States, June 15, 1867, Select Classes of Letters
Received by the Indian Division of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, RG 48m, M
825, R 1 (Executive), F 0534-0548, National Archives.
2. A comprehensive analysis of the struggle between the War and Interior Depart-
ments is Waltmann, "The Interior Department, War Department and Indian Policy, 1865-
1887" (1962) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Nebraska).
3. 0. TEMPLE & M. TEMPLE, NOTABLE MEN OF TENNESSEE, FROM 1833 To 1876, THEIR
TIMES AND THEIR CONTEMPORARIES 198-202 (1912); PATTEN, TENNESSEE CHRONICLE 246
(1953); Boutwell, The Oratory of Robert Love Taylor, 9 TENN. HISTORICAL Q. 10-45 (1950);
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1971, 1796.
4. 2 THE DIARY OF ORVILLE HICKMAN BROWNING 141 (Pease & Randle eds., 1933)
(hereinafter cited as DIARY].
5. 1 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 410-11 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
DICTIONARY]; W. PARRISH. MISSOURI UNDER RADICAL RULE,1865-1870, 78-88, 235 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as PARRISH]; Mering, The Whig Party in Missouri, 41 UNIV. OF MISSOURI
STUDIES 84, 186-87; F. SHOEMAKER, 2 MISSOURI AND MISSOURIANS, LAND OF CONTRASTS AND
PEOPLE OF ACHIEVEMENT 27, 54 (1943) [hereinafter cited as SHOEMAKER]; United States
Senator, Lewis V. Bogy, Bryan Obear Scrapbook Collection, Western Manuscript Collec-
tion, University of Missouri Library.
6. PARRISH, supra note 5, at 78; DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 411; Missouri Democrat
(St. Louis), Feb. 23, 26, 1866.
7. P. GATES. FIFTY MILLION ACRES: CONFLICTS OVER KANSAS LAND POLICY, 1854-1890,
140, 143, 156 (1954) [hereinafter cited as GATES].
8. DIARY, supra note 4, at xix.
9 Id. at xxii. See also GATES, supra note 7, at 157-58.
10. "Commissioner of Indian Affairs," H.R. No. 10, 39 Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1867)
(Serial 1303)[hereinafter cited as H.R. No. 10]; Bogy to Browning, Dec. 29, 1866, Report
Book No. 16, Indian Office, Report Books of the Office of Indian Affairs, RG 75, M 348, R,
16, F 0032, National Archives.
11. Missouri Democrat (St. Louis), Oct. 12, 1866.
12. Condition of the Indian Tribes: Report of the Joint Special Comm. Appointed
under joint Resolution of March 3, 1865, S.R. No. 159, 39 Cong., 2d Sess. (1865) (Serial
1279). See also Chaput, Generals, Indian Agents, Politicians: The Doolittle Survey of
1865, 3 WESTERN HISTORICAL Q. 269-82 (1972); Kelsey, The Doolittle Report of 1867: Its
Preparation and Shortcomings, 17 ARIZONA AND THE WEST 107-20 (1975).
13. Bogy to Browning, Jan. 23, 1867, Report Book No. 16, F 0043, National Archives.
14. Junction City Union (Junction City, Ks.), Mar. 16, 1867.
15. Defense of Mr. Commissioner Bogy Before the Committee of Indian Affairs of the
House of Representatives, 39 Cong, 2d Sess. 1 (Jan. 12, 1867) [hereinafter cited as Defense
of Bogy]; New York Times, Oct. 7,1866.
16. Defense of Bogy, supra note 15, at 2.
17. Id. at 38.
18. H.R. No. 10, supra note 10, at 4 (emphasis added).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1977
19. Id. at 10.
20. Browning to Bogy, Mar. 4, 1867: Browning to Lyman Trumbull, Apr. 8, 1867,
S.R. No. 140, 40 Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, July 26, 1868 (Serial 1320; 12 Stat. 792 (1863).
21. Report of Lyman Trumbull of the Senate Judiciary Committee, S.R. No. 140, at 2.
22. GATES. supra note 7, at 202.
23. Missouri Democrat, May 21 and 27, 1867.
24. Taylor to the President of the United States, June 15, 1867, Select Classes of Let-
ters Received, F 0534-0535, National Archives.
25. 4 Stat. 564 (1832).
26. 4 Stat. 735 (1834).
27. Taylor to the President of the United States, June 15, 1867, Select Classes of Let-
ters Received, F 0535-0539, National Archives.
28. Id., F 0539-0545.
29. SHOEMAKER, supra note 5, at 27, 54; DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 411.
30. Emporia News (Emporia, Ks.), June 25,1869.
31. Taylor to the President of the United States, June 30, 1868, Select Classes of Let-
ters Received, F 0546-0548, National Archives.
32. 58 CONG. GLOBE 670-80 (1849), containing the debate, including Calhoun's warn-
ing.
33. Taylor to Browning, June 30, 1869, Report Books of the Office of Indian Affairs, F
0172.
34. Morgan to the Editor, July 10, 1876, 23 NATION 41 (1876).
35. "Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1868," H. EXEC. Doc. No. 1, 40 Cong.,
3d Sess. Vol. 3 (Serial 1367), at p. 1.
36. A good example of the commission's peace strategy is Taylor's speech to several
Brule, Oglala, and Cheyenne leaders at North Platte, in the late summer of 1867. Portions
of it were printed in The Missouri Democrat, Sept. 26, 1867. For an example of Taylor's an-
timilitary position, see Taylor to W.T. Otto, July 12, 1867, Report Book No. 16, F 0178-
0179, National Archives.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol5/iss1/5
